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ABSTRACT 26 
In later life, people are faced with a multitude of risky decisions that concern their 27 
health, finance, and personal security. Older adults often exercise caution in situations that 28 
involve risk. In this research, we asked whether older adults are also more responsive to 29 
warnings about potential risk. An answer to this question could reveal a factor underlying 30 
increased cautiousness in older age. In Study 1, participants decided whether they would 31 
engage in risky activities (e.g., using an ATM machine in the street) in four realistic scenarios 32 
about which, participants could be expected to have relevant knowledge or experience. They 33 
then made posterior decisions after listening to audio extracts of real reports relevant to each 34 
activity. In Study 2, we explored the role that emotions play in decision updating. As in Study 35 
1, participants made prior and posterior decisions, with the exception that for each scenario 36 
the reports were presented in their original audio format (high emotive) or in a written 37 
transcript format (low emotive). Following each posterior decision, participants indicated 38 
their emotional valence and arousal responses to the reports. In both studies, older adults 39 
engaged in fewer risky activities than younger adults, indicative of increased cautiousness in 40 
older age, and exhibited stronger decision updating in response to the reports. Older adults 41 
also showed stronger emotional responses to the reports, even though emotional responses 42 
did not differ for audio and written transcript formats. Finally, age differences in emotional 43 
responses to the reports accounted for age differences in decision updating. 44 
 45 
 46 
 47 
 48 
 49 
 50 
Age and adaptation 
3 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 51 
In later life, people face a multitude of important decisions about their health, finance, 52 
and personal security. The outcomes of poor health choices are likely to be most apparent in 53 
older age as negative health outcomes, such as diabetes and heart disease, are more prevalent 54 
in later life.(1) Older adults are commonly exposed to warnings and advice about their health 55 
and are encouraged by health authorities to undergo regular health assessments.(2,3) Older 56 
adults also face numerous financial decisions, some of which are designed specifically to 57 
harm them. Financial fraud in the guise of sweepstakes and bogus lotteries is often targeted 58 
specifically at the elderly whom fraudsters perceive as vulnerable and gullible.(4,5) Many 59 
older adults must also decide whether to surrender their driving privileges and compromise 60 
their mobility on the basis of doctors’ recommendations and the advice of friends and 61 
family.(6) Psychological literature has often reported that older adults exercise caution in 62 
situations that involve risk,(7-9) particularly in health, recreational, and financial contexts.(10) 63 
Yet, are older adults also more responsive to warnings about potential risk? Answering this 64 
question could cast new light on a factor underlying increased cautiousness in older age. 65 
One method of assessing how people update their risky decision making has been to 66 
use behavioral tasks, in which individuals are provided feedback about the outcomes of their 67 
decisions across multiple trials.(11-13) Behavioral tasks simulate real world experience-based 68 
learning in situations that afford multiple learning opportunities. However, behavioral tasks 69 
have yielded mixed findings about age differences in experience-based learning. Older adults 70 
respond like younger adults to the negative outcomes of their decisions on some tasks(14,15) 71 
and are less responsive than younger adults on other tasks,(16,17) which is indicative of risk 72 
seeking behavior. This is the case on the widely used Iowa Gambling Task—a card game in 73 
which individuals must learn to avoid choosing cards from decks that yield large potential 74 
monetary wins but higher losses in favor of decks that yield smaller potential wins, but higher 75 
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average gain.(12,16) Differences in risk taking on this and similar tasks have commonly been 76 
attributed to impaired learning in older age.(14,16,17) 77 
Behavioral tasks that impose heavy demands on memory can impair the learning 78 
abilities of older adults. As in the Iowa Gambling Task, when individuals must learn to avoid 79 
a disadvantageous option in favor of an alternative that offers a higher gain in the long run, 80 
the decision options and their outcomes must be tracked across multiple trials.(18-19) Multi-81 
play decision tasks for which the decision maker has a long-run aspiration also elicit greater 82 
search,(20) which further burdens working memory resources.(21) The number of choice 83 
options also imposes additional demands on memory that impair decision making abilities in 84 
older adults. For example, older adults have been shown to make similar choices to younger 85 
adults when choosing between two risky options after first learning about their potential 86 
outcomes.(22) When the number of options is increased from two to four or eight options, 87 
raising the demands on memory, age differences in risky choice behavior emerge.(22)  88 
In real world situations rewards and losses are inversely related to their probabilities 89 
as large rewards (or losses) typically have small probabilities.(23) Severe events, such as car 90 
crashes, are rare(24)—and an individual may never experience the consequences of not 91 
wearing a seat belt. Other consequences of risk taking have a long time horizon, such as in 92 
the case of lung cancer and heart disease linked to smoking. Thus, many risky decisions may 93 
be made in everyday life without experiencing negative outcomes. Further, when experience 94 
is sampled over a period of time, such as months or even years, rare events (e.g., a car crash) 95 
are likely to be under-sampled, leading people to underestimate the probability of rare, but 96 
highly consequential events.(25,26)  97 
Expert advice, government campaigns, and media reports are intended to inform 98 
people’s decision making about serious risks.(27) For example, following an outbreak of the 99 
Zika virus in South America in 2015, the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention issued a 100 
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website to inform the public about the symptoms, diagnosis, and treatment of the Zika virus 101 
and preventive measures against infection.(28) The website was specifically aimed at women, 102 
warning of the risk that the Zika virus can be transmitted to the foetus of pregnant women. 103 
The introduction of pictorial health warnings to cigarette packaging is a further example of 104 
how government campaigns are designed to inform people’s decisions about health risks.(29) 105 
Some campaigns and awareness-raising strategies are targeted specifically at elderly people 106 
who may be vulnerable to injury as road users and to financial fraud.(4,6) When people base 107 
their decisions on expert advice or statistical risks reported in government campaigns and the 108 
media, they are making decisions from description.(30)  109 
Can descriptive information delivered by government campaigns and media reports 110 
overcome personal experience? In one study, Yechiam, Barron, and Erev(31) recorded visits 111 
made to Israeli hotels before and after a series of terrorist attacks in Israel. Hotel visits among 112 
foreign tourists decreased by 80% following the attacks, indicating that media reports of the 113 
attacks strongly influenced the travel choices of foreign tourists. Yet, hotel visits among 114 
domestic tourists actually increased by 20% during the same period. Unlike the foreign 115 
tourists, the Israeli tourists had accrued a vast amount of personal experience about the rarity 116 
of such terrorist attacks, many of whom may never have experienced of a terrorist attack. 117 
Thus, media reports may have little impact on decision making in situations that people have 118 
accrued personal experience. Even statistical risks, such as those used in government 119 
campaigns, may have less impact than the influence of personal experience. For example, 120 
Betsch, Haase, Renkewitz, and Schmid(32) asked participants to assess the riskiness of a 121 
vaccine used to prevent a fictitious severe disease. To help inform their judgment, they were 122 
also told about the statistical likelihood of adverse effects of the vaccine. Participants were 123 
then asked to imagine finding on an internet bulletin board, information about instances of 124 
positive and negative effects of taking the vaccine. Crucially, even though the participants 125 
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knew the objective risk of the vaccine, they were strongly influenced by their exposure to the 126 
individual instances in which the vaccine had led to positive and negative outcomes. This 127 
finding suggests that experiencing a single event (e.g., a positive or negative outcome of a 128 
vaccine) can overpower the influence of a statistical report that summarises many such 129 
events. When a negative outcome is rare (e.g., a car crash) an individual may experience a 130 
vast number occasions in which the negative outcome does not occur (i.e., a crash-free 131 
journey). Consequently, the provision of a statistical report, such as in the form of a road 132 
safety campaign, could have very little impact on risk perception and decision making. 133 
If personal experience weighs heavily on people’s decision making about risks that 134 
have rare consequences, then older adults may actually be less responsive than younger adults 135 
to warnings about potential risk. For rare, but highly consequential events, older adults will 136 
have encountered many more instances than younger adults, in which their decision making 137 
(e.g., not wearing a seatbelt) did not lead to a negative event (e.g., a road traffic injury). In 138 
some contexts, an older adult may never have experienced negative consequences of their 139 
risky choices. Similar to the domestic tourists in Israel, warnings delivered in media reports 140 
and government campaigns may have relatively little impact on the decision making of older 141 
adults in contexts that are highly familiar to them. 142 
 On the other hand, developmental research indicates that a tendency to update beliefs 143 
about familiar risks (e.g., likelihood of a home burglary) in response to undesirable news 144 
increases from adolescence to young adulthood.(33) In this task, participants first estimated the 145 
likelihood of adverse life events. They were then informed about the actual numerical risk of 146 
each event that was either desirable (i.e., the actual likelihood was lower than their own 147 
estimate) or undesirable (i.e., the likelihood was higher than their estimate) and were asked to 148 
make a second re-estimate of the likelihood of each event. Belief updating following 149 
desirable news was independent of age. Conversely, a tendency to update beliefs in the 150 
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direction of the true likelihood of an adverse event following undesirable news was found to 151 
increase from age 9 years to age 26 years. If the tendency to update beliefs in response to 152 
undesirable news extends to decision making in later life, older adults may show a stronger 153 
tendency to update their risky decision making in response to warnings about risk.  154 
Why might belief updating about negative events increase with age? One possibility is 155 
that age-related dopaminergic decline motivates avoidance of negative outcomes. Previous 156 
research has found that lower levels of dopamine are related to an increased likelihood of 157 
avoiding negative outcomes, and that increased dopamine levels are related to increased 158 
sensitivity to positive outcomes. In general, dopamine levels decline with age. Using a 159 
probabilistic selection task, Frank and Kong(34) reported that older adults showed an enhanced 160 
tendency to learn from negative compared to positive consequences of their decisions. 161 
Moreover, negative mood, which is associated with depleted dopamine levels,(35) is linked to 162 
heightened risk perceptions in older age. For example, Chou, Lee, and Ho(36) found that a 163 
negative mood-inducing manipulation, in the form of a mood-arousing video clip, reduced 164 
risk taking among older adults for hypothetical real life dilemmas, but had no such effect on 165 
younger adults. Conversely, Carpenter, Peters, Västfjäll, and Isen(37) found that inducing 166 
positive feelings in older adults increased their frequency of card choices from “gain” decks 167 
that yielded monetary wins over “loss” decks that yielded monetary losses. Hence, despite 168 
older adults’ lifetime of accrued experience, the above findings suggest that they may exhibit 169 
stronger decision updating tendencies than younger adults in response to warnings about risk, 170 
perhaps due to negative mood-inducing effects of warnings.    171 
In the current research, we studied risky decision making in younger and healthy older 172 
adults in the local community. In contrast with previous approaches that have used monetary 173 
gambles(9,17) or examples of extreme activities (e.g., bungee jumping),(38) we designed four 174 
everyday scenarios about which people of all ages would have some relevant knowledge or 175 
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experience. Scenarios described visiting a family member in a local hospital despite poor 176 
weather (weather scenario), using an ATM machine in the street (fraud scenario), ordering a 177 
high-salt meal at a restaurant (health scenario), and accepting a car ride without access to a 178 
seat belt (safety scenario). Participants made initial (prior) decisions about whether to engage 179 
in each activity. They then listened to audio extracts of real reports relevant to each scenario; 180 
either a forecast of severe weather (weather scenario), a report on ATM fraud (fraud 181 
scenario), a report on salt consumption (health scenario), or a report on seat belt use (safety 182 
scenario). Decision updating was assessed by asking participants to make posterior decisions 183 
following each audio report. 184 
STUDY 1 185 
2. METHOD 186 
2.1. Participants 187 
The research was approved by the appropriate IRB committee. All participants 188 
provided informed consent. Thirty nine younger (18-35 years of age; mean age=23.18 years; 189 
54% male) and 39 older (65-82 years of age; mean age=72.58 years; 39% male) volunteers 190 
participated. The target sample size was based on previous studies. The mini-mental state 191 
examination was used to screen for cognitive impairment with scores greater than 25 192 
indicative of intact cognition. All participants passed the screen.  193 
2.2. Materials and Procedure 194 
For each of four scenarios, participants were asked to make an initial (prior) decision 195 
about whether they would engage in an activity described in the scenario. A weather scenario 196 
read: 197 
“A member of your family who you are very close to is unwell and requires 198 
surgery at the Royal Victoria Hospital in Belfast. Tomorrow is your only 199 
opportunity to visit them at the hospital before their surgery. On the other hand, 200 
you hear on the radio and see on television that there is a weather warning of 201 
heavy rain and strong winds for tomorrow.”  202 
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For which participants were asked to make a decision about whether or not they would visit 203 
their family member despite the potential bad weather. A fraud scenario read: 204 
“You are late for an appointment in town and need to withdraw some money 205 
on your way. You pass by a bank.” 206 
For which they were asked whether or not they would use the ATM machine outside the bank 207 
rather than use a machine inside the bank. A health scenario read: 208 
“You visit a restaurant that offers a choice of meal options. Among the 209 
options is your favourite dish, but which you know to be typically high in salt. 210 
Other meal options are also appealing.”  211 
For which they were asked whether or not they would order their favorite meal at the 212 
restaurant. And a safety scenario read: 213 
“You visit a friend who lives a short walk from your home. It is late and your 214 
friend offers you a lift home. Your friend is safety conscious, but has been 215 
reupholstering the seats in their car, which means that the seatbelts are currently 216 
not attached.” 217 
For which they were asked whether or not they would accept a short ride home from their 218 
friend. 219 
Following their initial (prior) decisions, participants listened to an audio report 220 
relevant to each scenario that indicated a significant domain relevant risk. A report of severe 221 
weather in the local area was heard for the weather scenario (duration 1 min 24 sec; see 222 
supplementary material for transcript); a crime report on ATM fraud was heard for the fraud 223 
scenario (duration 2 min 20 sec); a health report on the dangers of a high sodium diet was 224 
heard for the health scenario (duration 1 min 43 sec); and a government road safety campaign 225 
on seat belt use was heard for the safety scenario (duration 28 sec). Following each report, 226 
participants were asked: “Please describe what you just heard in the report in a way that could 227 
inform someone else’s decision making who has not heard the report”. This was done in 228 
order to encourage participants to reflect on the information provided in the audio reports. 229 
They were then asked to make a second (posterior) decision about whether to engage in each 230 
activity having heard the report. Prior and posterior decisions were made before moving onto 231 
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the next scenario and scenarios were completed in a randomly generated order for each 232 
participant. 233 
3. RESULTS 234 
First, we assessed age and scenario differences in participants’ prior decisions. In 235 
order to take account of the clustering within our data, we conducted a random effects logistic 236 
regression analysis on prior decisions and included age group (older vs. younger) and 237 
scenario (weather, fraud, health, safety) as factors. This analysis revealed that older adults 238 
decided in favor of engaging in significantly fewer activities (76%) than their younger 239 
counterparts (94%; OR = 0.15, t = 3.90, p < .001), which is indicative of increased 240 
cautiousness in older age. The analysis also revealed scenario differences in risky decision 241 
making. Decisions in favor of engaging in the activities described in the reports were most 242 
frequent in the weather scenario (94%), followed by the health (90%; vs. weather, OR = 0.56, 243 
t = 0.92, p = .360), fraud (87%; vs. weather, OR = 0.42, t = 1.42, p = .155), and safety 244 
scenarios (71%; vs. weather, OR = 0.11, t = 3.66, p < .001). 245 
Crucially, if older adults are more responsive to warnings than younger adults, they 246 
should alter their decision making more than younger adults in response to the reports. To 247 
assess posterior decision making, we conducted a random effects logistic regression analysis 248 
on participants’ posterior decisions, including age and scenario as factors, and controlling for 249 
prior decisions. This analysis revealed that older adults were significantly less likely 250 
(48%posterior vs. 76%prior) than their younger counterparts (88%posterior vs. 94%prior) to decide in 251 
favor of engaging in the activities described in the reports (OR = 0.09, t = 5.39, p < .001). 252 
Inspection of Figure 1 confirms that in all four scenarios older adults were more responsive to 253 
the reports than younger adults in their posterior decision making.  254 
 255 
 256 
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STUDY 2 257 
In Study 1, older adults were more cautious than younger adults in their initial risk 258 
taking. Older adults were also more responsive to descriptive information about risk 259 
delivered in the audio reports. One possibility is that age-related differences in emotion 260 
processing partly explain the stronger tendency to update decisions about risk in older age. 261 
Depleted dopamine levels are associated with negative mood(35) which, in turn, is associated 262 
with avoidance behavior(34) and reduced risk taking(36) in older age. Perhaps older adults are 263 
more responsive to the negative mood-inducing effects of warnings about potential risk, 264 
which leads them to engage in greater decision updating to avoid negative potential 265 
outcomes. We explored this possibility in Study 2 by measuring participants’ emotional 266 
valence and arousal responses to the reports. Specifically, we were interested in whether (a) 267 
negative emotional responses are associated with a stronger tendency to update posterior 268 
decision making, and whether (b) stronger negative emotional responses in older adults relate 269 
to age differences in decision updating.  270 
The audio reports used in Study 1 may have been intensely mood-arousing, not only 271 
because of the descriptive information they provide about severe negative events (e.g., ATM 272 
fraud), but also because of their auditory format. For example, participants listened to a 273 
government road safety campaign on seat belt use in the safety scenario, which included 274 
realistic sounds of a car crash. Indeed, such campaigns are intentionally designed to induce 275 
intense-emotional responses in the listener. In Study 2, we further explored whether the 276 
auditory format of the reports, in addition to their descriptive content, influences decision 277 
updating tendencies. To do so, each participant received audio reports presented in the same 278 
format used in Study 1 for two of the four scenarios and received written transcripts of the 279 
audio reports for the remaining two scenarios. We hypothesized that if the auditory format of 280 
the reports added to their emotional intensity then delivering them in a written transcript 281 
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format should reduce their emotional intensity and thus reduce age differences in decision 282 
updating. 283 
4. METHOD 284 
4.1. Participants 285 
The research was approved by the appropriate IRB committee and all participants 286 
provided informed consent. Forty younger (18-35 years of age; mean age = 21.80 years; 45% 287 
male) and 40 older (65-90 years of age; mean age = 73.93; 40% male) volunteers participated 288 
in the study. A score of greater than 25 on the mini-mental state examination was used to 289 
indicate intact cognition in our screening of older adults. All participants passed the screen. 290 
4.2. Materials and Procedure 291 
Participants were shown the same four scenarios used in Study 1. For each scenario, 292 
they were asked to make an initial (prior) decision about whether they would engage in the 293 
activity described in the scenario. Participants were then provided the same four reports used 294 
in Study 1 on which to base their second (posterior) decision. For two of the four scenarios 295 
participants received the corresponding audio report presented in the same format used in 296 
Study 1. For the two remaining scenarios, they instead received a written transcript of the 297 
audio report, rather than listen to the report directly (see supplementary material for 298 
transcript). Using a mixed design, participants were pseudo-randomly assigned to receive two 299 
of the four reports in the audio format and the remaining two in the written transcript format. 300 
Hence, 10 participants received audio reports for the weather and fraud scenarios and written 301 
transcripts for the health and safety scenarios, 10 participants received audio reports for the 302 
weather and heath scenarios and written transcripts for the fraud and safety scenarios, and so 303 
on, to ensure balanced participant numbers across all four combinations of scenario and 304 
report format. 305 
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We used the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM)(39) to assess emotional valence and 306 
arousal responses to the reports. After making each posterior decision, participants were 307 
shown a row of nine basic drawings depicting a person (i.e., the manikin) ranging from very 308 
sad (value of -4), to neutral (value of 0), to very happy (value of 4) from the left to right side 309 
of the computer monitor. Participants were instructed that “The faces below are arranged on 310 
a continuum from unhappy (left) through to happy (right).” Participants were asked to 311 
indicate their emotional valence response to the report in an instruction that read: “Please 312 
indicate how you felt whilst [listening to, reading] the report you just [heard, read]. To make 313 
your choice, select the corresponding option box located below the faces. If you felt 314 
completely neutral, neither happy nor sad, select the option box below the middle figure.” 315 
Next, participants were shown a row of nine basic drawings depicting a person ranging from 316 
very calm (value of 1; left) to very anxious (value of 10; right) and were instructed that “The 317 
faced below are arranged on a continuum from calm (left) through to anxious (right).” They 318 
were asked to indicate their arousal response to the report in an instruction that read “Please 319 
indicate how you felt whilst [listening to, reading] the report you just [heard, read]. To make 320 
your choice, select the corresponding option box located below the faces.” Finally, 321 
participants were asked “How informative did you find the report in your decision making 322 
about whether to [make the journey tomorrow, use the cash machine outside the bank, order 323 
your favourite meal at the restaurant, accept the short lift home from your friend]” and 324 
provided their rating on a 100-point scale ranging from “Not at all informative” (value of 1) 325 
to “Extremely informative (value of 100). 326 
5. RESULTS 327 
First, we assessed age and scenario differences in participants’ prior decisions. We 328 
conducted a random effects logistic regression analysis on their prior decisions, including age 329 
group (older vs. younger) and scenario (weather, fraud, health, safety) as factors. This 330 
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analysis confirmed that older adults engaged in fewer risky activities (70%) in their initial 331 
risk taking compared to younger adults (88%; OR = 0.19, t = 3.33, p = .001), indicating 332 
greater cautiousness in older age. The analysis also confirmed a trend in risky decision 333 
making across scenarios that was similar to the trend discovered in Study 1. Decisions in 334 
favor of engaging in the activities were most frequent in the weather scenario (95%), 335 
followed by the health (84%; vs. weather, OR = 0.20, t = 2.41, p = .016), fraud (81%; vs. 336 
weather, OR = 0.16, t = 2.77, p = .006), and safety scenarios (56% vs. weather, OR = 0.03, t 337 
= 5.06, p < .001). 338 
Next, we assessed participants’ posterior decisions on the basis of their age and the 339 
presentation format (transcript vs. audio) of the reports. Controlling for prior decisions in a 340 
random effects logistic regression analysis, older adults were significantly less likely than 341 
their younger counterparts to decide in favor of engaging in the activities described in the 342 
reports (Table 1; Model 1). However, the age differences between prior (88%younger; 70%older) 343 
and posterior decisions (76%younger; 53%older) were much smaller than those observed in Study 344 
1. In comparison to Study 1, younger adults were more responsive to the reports in their 345 
posterior decision making. Participants were not significantly more responsive to the audio 346 
format (79%initial; 66%posterior) than to the written transcript format (79%initial; 63%posterior) in 347 
making their posterior decisions (Table 1; Model 1). Including an interaction term between 348 
age and presentation format did not reveal that age differences in decision updating depended 349 
on the presentation format of the reports (OR = 1.38, t = 0.45, p = .654). 350 
Did younger and older adults differ in their emotional responses to the reports? We 351 
conducted a random effects linear regression on participants’ valence ratings, including age 352 
(older vs. younger), scenario (weather, fraud, health, safety), and report format (transcript vs. 353 
audio) as factors. This analysis revealed that older adults were significantly more negative in 354 
their valence response to the reports (M = -0.28) than younger adults (M = 0.43; Table 2). 355 
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There were also significant scenario differences in participants’ valence responses (Table 2). 356 
Participants were least negative in their response to the health report (M = 0.90), followed by 357 
the weather (M = 0.29), fraud (M = 0.03), and safety reports (M = -0.90). Valence responses 358 
were stronger for audio reports (M = 0.05) than for written transcript reports (M = 0.11), but 359 
this difference was not significant (Table 2).  360 
Next, we tested for age, scenario, and report format differences in arousal responses 361 
using a random effects linear regression analysis. Older adults exhibited stronger arousal 362 
responses to the reports (M = 5.48) than did younger adults (M = 4.68; Table 2). The analysis 363 
also revealed scenario differences in arousal response (Table 2). Arousal was strongest in 364 
response the safety report (M = 6.01), followed by the weather (M = 5.2), fraud (M = 4.99), 365 
and health reports (M = 4.11). Finally, while arousal responses were stronger for audio 366 
reports (M = 5.19) than for written transcripts (M = 4.96), this difference was not significant 367 
(Table 2). 368 
Did younger and older adults differ in how informative they perceived the reports? To 369 
test for age, scenario, and report format differences in informative ratings we conducted a 370 
random effects linear regression analysis. While older adults rated the reports as slightly less 371 
informative (M = 55.61) than did their younger counterparts (M = 59.60), our analysis 372 
indicated that this age difference was not significant (Table 2). Participants rated the weather 373 
report as most informative (M = 65.34), followed by the safety (M = 59.55), fraud (M = 374 
59.15), and health reports (M = 46.39). Finally, participants also rated audio reports as more 375 
informative (M = 60.04) than written transcript (M = 55.18), but this differences was not 376 
significant (Table 2).  377 
Did emotional responses and informative ratings account for tendencies to update 378 
posterior decision making in response to the reports? Posterior decisions against engaging in 379 
the activities described in the scenarios were associated with a stronger negative valence 380 
Age and adaptation 
16 
 
response and higher informative ratings for the reports (Table 1: Model 2). In a third block, 381 
we included all possible interaction terms involving age group (older vs. younger), valence, 382 
arousal, and informative ratings (Table 1: Model 3). There were no significant interactions 383 
with age. However, valence interacted with arousal, such that arousal only influenced 384 
posterior decisions when the valence was negative. Indeed, valence was a strong negative 385 
predictor of arousal (b = -0.79, t = 12.11, p < .001), which indicates that the reports were 386 
arousing when they were negative, leading to a stronger influence on decision making.  387 
Finally, we tested whether valence and arousal responses and informative ratings 388 
accounted for age differences in posterior decisions. Recall that older adults showed stronger 389 
valence and arousal responses to the reports, but did not differ from younger adults in their 390 
informative ratings for the reports. We conducted a random effects logistic regression 391 
analysis on posterior decisions, including valence, arousal, and informative ratings in separate 392 
models, and in each model we controlled for prior decisions. Age differences in posterior 393 
decisions remained significant after partialing out informative ratings (OR = 0.32, t = 2.44, p 394 
= .015), but not after partialing out valence (OR = 0.57, t = 0.96, p = .338) or arousal 395 
responses (OR = 0.52, t = 1.40, p = .161). 396 
In sum, older adults made fewer risky decisions than their younger counterparts and 397 
were also more responsive to warnings about risk, albeit less so than in Study 1. Older adults 398 
also showed stronger emotional valence and arousal responses to the reports, even though 399 
emotional responses did not differ between audio and written transcript formats of the 400 
reports. Reports that were perceived as highly informative or that elicited a stronger 401 
emotional response were more influential on posterior decision making. Controlling for 402 
informative ratings, age differences in emotional valence and arousal patialed out age 403 
differences in decision updating. 404 
 405 
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6. DISCUSSION 406 
Older adults face many risky decisions, including ones about their health, finance, and 407 
personal security. In later life, people are exposed to numerous warnings and advice about 408 
their health and safety, such as whether to continue driving.(6) Government campaigns and 409 
awareness raising strategies often target the elderly who may be vulnerable to financial 410 
fraud.(4,5) In the current research, we investigated whether older adults are more responsive to 411 
warnings about potential risk with a view to uncovering an underlying cause of increased 412 
cautiousness in older age. Our studies revealed that older adults were less likely than their 413 
younger counterparts to engage in risky activities described in realistic scenarios and were 414 
also more responsive to warnings about potential risk delivered in reports taken from the 415 
media and government campaigns. This finding points to decision updating tendencies as a 416 
potential underlying cause of increased cautiousness in later life. We can expect that most 417 
individuals will have been exposed to similar such warnings (e.g., severe weather forecasts, 418 
health and dietary warnings) in their daily lives. Older adults may have exhibited greater 419 
caution in their initial decision making as a result of previous exposure to similar warnings 420 
experienced in their daily lives. 421 
Why are older adults more responsive to warnings about potential risk? One possible 422 
explanation is that warnings elicit stronger emotional responses in older adults, motivating 423 
them to avoid negative consequences of their decision making. Age-related decline in 424 
dopamine levels is associated with negative mood in older age(35) and avoidance of negative 425 
outcomes.(34) When negative mood is induced in older adults (e.g., using mood-arousing 426 
video clips), risk taking behavior further declines.(36) In our studies, we exposed participants 427 
to reports taken from real media and government campaigns, some of which were designed to 428 
elicit strong emotional responses. In the safety scenario, for example, participants listened to 429 
a government campaign designed to increase seat belt use that realistically portrayed a road 430 
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traffic accident. In Study 2, we found that when controlling for participants’ ratings of how 431 
informative the reports were, stronger emotional responses were associated with greater 432 
decision updating in response to the reports. Additionally, older adults reported stronger 433 
negative mood and arousal in response to the reports and their emotional responses accounted 434 
for age differences in decision updating. 435 
While older adults appear to experience more intense negative emotions in response 436 
to warnings about risk, emotional well-being and emotional stability have been shown to 437 
improve across adulthood.(40) Older adults review positive features of choice options for 438 
longer and attend less to negative features compared to younger adults.(41) They also report 439 
experiencing less negative emotional arousal than younger adults when evaluating loss cues 440 
in anticipation of monetary outcomes. (42) This prioritising of positive emotions in later life 441 
has been explained in terms of socio emotional selectivity theory. (43,44) The theory posits that 442 
as an individual’s time horizon shortens positive emotional experiences are prioritised over 443 
negative emotional experiences. Despite prioritising positive emotions, older adults are more 444 
vulnerable to some negative consequences of their decision making than people in younger 445 
age ranges, especially in situations involving risk of physical harm and illness. Older drivers, 446 
passengers, and pedestrians, for example, are much more likely than younger road users to be 447 
fatally injured as a result of a road traffic collision, owing to their increased susceptibility to 448 
incur physical injury.(45) We can expect that individuals adapt to their own physical and social 449 
vulnerabilities in later life by heightening their emotional responses to harmful potential 450 
outcomes. Indeed, the scenarios we used in our studies all involved decisions that had severe 451 
negative consequences. 452 
In the current research, we selected risk taking scenarios about which younger and 453 
older adults would have some prior knowledge or experience. For example, most people will 454 
have experienced using an ATM machine outside a bank (fraud scenario) or choosing among 455 
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meal options at a restaurant (health scenario). Previous research has suggested that prior 456 
experience can overcome the influence of media reports(31) and statistical information(32) on 457 
risk perception and decision making. Even when experience is accrued over a long period of 458 
time, an individual may never experience severe negative outcomes of their decision making 459 
when the outcomes are rare (e.g., bank fraud as a result of using an ATM machine) or have a 460 
long time horizon (e.g., heart failure due to a diet rich in salt). This tendency can lead people 461 
to underestimate the probability of rare events and underweight the importance of descriptive 462 
information.(25,26,30) Our findings do not necessarily challenge this view. At least in Study 1, 463 
younger adults were relatively non-responsive to the reports (Figure 1). Although older adults 464 
were more responsive than younger adults to descriptive information, the results of Study 2 465 
suggest that when descriptive information is delivered in the form of warnings it can evoke 466 
stronger negative emotional responses in older adults that lead to greater decision updating in 467 
older age. An interesting direction for future research would be to explore age differences in 468 
decision updating in contexts that people have acquired less personal experience. For 469 
example, individuals who live in areas unaffected by the Ebola virus or Zika virus may be 470 
highly responsive to media reports and statistics issued in government reports.(27) In such 471 
situations, age differences in decision updating may even be stronger than those reported in 472 
our studies, as the greater personal experience accrued by older adults may have helped 473 
downplay the impact of descriptive information. 474 
The influence of personal experience may help explain why people are far less 475 
responsive to advice than they should be,(46) a phenomenon known as ‘egocentric advice 476 
discounting’, which is proposed to result from strong beliefs in the importance of one’s own 477 
opinion.(47-49) In one study, Yaniv and Kleinberger(49) questioned participants about the dates 478 
of historical events. They then gave participants a second attempt at each question, this time 479 
presenting participants with their previous response and a response suggested by an advisor. 480 
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Participants were shown to place considerably greater weight on their own responses than the 481 
suggestions of their advisor. However, participants were sensitive to the quality of their own 482 
responses in their uptake of the advice and were more receptive of good advice than they 483 
were of bad advice. Similarly, in Study 2, we found that participants were more responsive to 484 
warnings that they perceived as informative. Perceived informativeness may even be a 485 
necessary condition for responding to warnings that are highly emotive. We found that 486 
warnings that elicited intense emotional responses influenced decision updating when a 487 
warning was also perceived as highly informative. 488 
Research on advice taking in decision making has shown how characteristics of the 489 
advisor (e.g., their reputation) influence the uptake of advice.(49) Our studies show in a risky 490 
decision making context that the age of the individual receiving advice also determines its 491 
uptake. We used a similar experimental procedure to procedures used in advice taking 492 
studies; namely, participants first made an initial (prior) decision and then made a second 493 
(posterior) decision after receiving advice in the form of an audio warning. Our findings 494 
suggest that age differences in emotional processing underlie stronger decision updating in 495 
older age. An alternative possibility is that older adults are more compliant with requests in 496 
experimental settings. The experimental procedure, in which posterior decision making was 497 
assessed following the delivery of advice, is likely to have been salient to participants. 498 
However, social desirability, which underpins compliance, has not been found to differ with 499 
age.(50) Thus, it would seem unlikely that individual differences in compliance explain our 500 
current findings. Another possibility is that younger adults strive to be consistent in their 501 
behavior and as a result responded less to the warnings in their posterior decision making. 502 
However, conscientiousness, which promotes consistent behavior, actually increases with age 503 
across adulthood.(51) As such, greater conscientiousness in older age may even have 504 
dampened the size of the age effects we observed on decision updating. 505 
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In conclusion, our findings demonstrate that older adults are more responsive than 506 
younger adults to warnings about potential risk, which may partly explain why older adults 507 
are often cautious in situations that involve risk. Our findings also contribute to a growing 508 
body of literature pointing to the importance of emotional factors in risk taking and possibly 509 
as a basis of cautiousness in older adults. 510 
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 677 
Table 1. Experiment 2: Logistic regression models used to predict posterior decisions  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Included Odds Ratio (95% CI) Odds Ratio (95% CI) Odds Ratio (95% CI) 
Constant 0.02 (0.00: 0.20)* 0.42 (0.02: 11.45)* 0.07 (0.00: 38.81)* 
Prior decisions 632.53  
(60.41: 6622.67)** 
9,787.37  
(349.59: 274,010.71)** 
7,448.72 
(270.07: 205,443.00)** 
Age     
Older vs. younger 0.38 (0.16: 0.92)* 0.35 (0.10: 1.25) 0.28 (0.00: 23.60) 
Scenario    
Weather 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Fraud 0.43 (0.18: 1.06) 0.33 (0.10: 1.10) 0.47 (0.15: 1.50) 
Health 3.41 (1.07: 10.93)* 1.19 (0.28: 5.05) 1.68 (0.40: 7.02) 
Safety 0.56 (0.21: 1.53) 1.00 (0.26: 3.88) 2.14 (0.49: 9.45) 
Report format    
Transcript vs. audio 0.74 (0.36: 1.51) 0.61 (0.24: 1.55) 0.72 (0.29: 1.80) 
Valence  1.95 (1.15: 3.32)* 0.53 (0.10: 2.75) 
Arousal  0.76 (0.57: 1.01) 0.97 (0.40: 2.38) 
Informative  0.95 (0.92: 0.97)** 0.97 (0.91: 1.03) 
Age x valence   0.83 (0.34: 2.01) 
Age x arousal   1.04 (0.61: 1.78) 
Age x informative   1.00 (0.95: 1.04) 
Valence x arousal   1.41 (1.19: 1.66)** 
Valence x informative   1.00 (0.98: 1.01) 
Arousal x informative   1.00 (0.99: 1.01) 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .001.  678 
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  691 
Table 2. Experiment 2: Linear regression models used to predict valence, arousal, and informative ratings  
 Valence Arousal Informative 
Included beta (95% CI) beta (95% CI) beta (95% CI) 
Constant 1.23 (0.84: 1.61)** 5.73 (5.09: 6.37)** 69.76 (61.87: 77.65)** 
Age     
Older vs. younger -0.71 (-0.28: -1.13)* 0.79 (0.04: 1.55)* -3.99 (-12.31: 4.33) 
Scenario    
Weather -0.61 (-0.27: -0.96)* -0.81 (-0.31: -1.31)* 1.00 
Fraud -0.88 (-0.53: -1.22)** -1.03 (-0.52: -1.53)** -6.19 (-13.62: 1.24) 
Health 1.00 -1.90 (-1.40: -2.40) -18.95 (-11.52: -26.38)** 
Safety -1.80 (-1.45: -2.15)** 1.00 -5.79 (-13.22: 1.64) 
Report format    
Transcript vs. audio 0.06 (-1.19: 0.30) -0.23 (-0.59: 0.12) -4.86 (-10.12: 0.39) 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .001.  692 
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 712 
Figure 1. Percentage of decisions in favor of engaging in each activity in the four scenarios 713 
before (prior) and after (posterior) hearing each audio report. Vertical bars represent 1 714 
standard error above and below the mean. 715 
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